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The article reviews the external representation of the European Union. 
Hoffmeister first analyses the rules established by the Lisbon Treaty 
(2007). He emphasizes the division between the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and non-CFSP and the importance of the 
diplomatic level. Moreover, he interprets recent case law in which 
the European Court of Justice has given guidance to the Council and 
the Commission about their respective roles in policy-making and 
representation. The author then provides extensive case studies on Iran, 
Ukraine, trade negotiations and environmental negotiations to track 
down relevant practice of the last seven years. He concludes that Europe 
continues to operate a multi-layered system of external representation, 
where supra-national elements with a strong role of the Commission 
in important areas are combined with inter-governmental traits of a 
principal–agent relationship between the Council and its President or 
the High Representative.
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1. Introduction
When dealing with the external representation of the European Union 
at the beginning of the last decade, the drafters of the (failed) constitu-
tion faced many challenges.1 There had been a widespread perception 
that too many actors could speak for the EU, including the rotating 
presidency of the Council of Ministers. As the latter changes every 
half-year between different Member States with diverging priorities, this 
was deemed detrimental to the coherence of the EU’s external policies. 
Moreover, even when looking at the EU institutions which could 
provide some continuity, there was another problem. Before Lisbon, the 
EU had nominated a High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) while maintaining at the same time a European 
Commissioner for External Relations in the College of Commissioners. 
These two offices (held respectively by Javier Solana and Chris Patten, 
later Benita Ferrero-Waldner) were often stepping on each other’s feet, 
thereby creating internal friction and external incoherence.2
In order to tackle these challenges, the Working Group VII of the 
European Convention recommended some fundamental reforms.3 First, 
it propagated the institutional novelty of a ‘double-hatting’. The same 
person who is nominated as High Representative (HR) for the CFSP 
should also become Vice-President of the Commission, being in charge of 
external relations in the College.4 This was sought to be a radical solution 
for the turf battle between the Berlaymont (seat of the Commission) and 
the Justus Lipsius (seat of the Council and the HR) buildings: it kept the 
powers of the two institutions alive but concentrated the execution of 
their decisions into the hands of one person. Second, that person should 
also ensure the external representation of the Union to ‘improve the 
visibility, clarity and continuity of EU external representation vis-à-vis 
third countries’.5 Between the lines, this move was designed to strip the 
rotating presidency of the Council of its powers in external representa-
tion. The so-called CFSP ‘troikas’ with representatives from a Member 
 1 For an overview of the draft constitution with respect to external relations see M 
Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’ (2003) 
40 CML Rev 1347.
 2 For an overview of the pre-Lisbon situation, see B Martenczuk, ‘The External 
Representation of the European Union: From Fragmentation to a Single European Voice?’ 
in A Fischer-Lescano, H-P Gasser, T Marauhn and N Ronzitti (eds), Frieden in Freiheit: 
Festschrift für Michael Bothe zum 70. Geburtstag (Nomos 2008) 941.
 3 European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, CONV 
459/02 of 16 December 2002.
 4 ibid, Recommendation No 5, 5.
 5 ibid, Recommendation No 13, last bullet, 10.
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State holding the presidency, the HR and the Commission should 
thus become a matter of the past.6 This, so the drafters sought, would 
make the High Representative the main external representative of the 
European Union – a European foreign minister. 
Although the project of a European constitution failed due to 
negative referenda in France and the Netherlands, most of these 
reform proposals were later incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon 
(2009). A more cosmetic, but nevertheless telling change, upon which 
the Member States (represented by the Foreign Ministers) insisted, was 
to downgrade the title of the new EU Foreign Policy Chief: he became 
the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy’. This description lacked any ‘ministerial’ credence, aiming to 
dispel fears related to terms that could evoke the image of a ‘state’7 
(and is far too long for any full newspaper quote). But apart from such 
symbolic moves, he kept his upgraded powers on substance as the lead 
figure on foreign policy, including presiding permanently over the 
Foreign Affairs Council and acting as the Commission Vice-President 
on external relations. Seven years after the Treaty’s entry into force, a 
couple of questions can be asked about the actual implementation of 
this design: How has the external representation of the EU evolved? 
Does Europe now have a single voice and did the turf battles between 
institutions come to an end? In order to respond to these questions, 
the present contribution will first recall in some detail the current 
legal foundation of the EU’s external representation. We will then 
review some selected practice in the field of CFSP and non-CFSP before 
concluding.
2. The Lisbon rules on external representation
2.1 the division between Cfsp and non-Cfsp
The Treaty’s first guiding principle to organize the external relations 
of the European Union can be found in the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU). As an overall ‘federalization’ of European foreign policy had 
been a political non-option for a couple of Member States, the treaty 
 6 ibid, Recommendation No 5, last bullet, 5.
 7 C Kaddous, ‘Role and Position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy under the Lisbon Treaty’, in S Griller and J Ziller (eds), The 
Lisbon Treaty – EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008) 
205, 206.
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kept the fundamental duality between CFSP and non-CFSP provisions 
alive.8 In particular, the Lisbon Treaty did not result in a ‘communitari-
zation’ of the CFSP.9
While enacting a couple of general provisions on the Union’s 
external action in the first chapter of Title V (Articles 21–22 TEU), the 
entire second chapter is thus dedicated to ‘common foreign and security 
policy’ (CFSP). That policy is ‘subject to specific rules and procedures’ 
(Article 24(2), 1st sentence TEU). In short, CFSP decision-making is 
in the hands of the European Council and the Council (Article 26(2) 
TEU), while the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (HR) ensures the implementation thereof (Article 
27(1) TEU). Importantly, under Article 27(2) TEU, the HR ‘shall 
represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and 
security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties 
on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in interna-
tional organisations and at international conferences’. A newly created 
European External Action Service is put at his disposal to carry out 
these functions (Article 27(3) TEU). A certain lacunae, though, exists 
for the question of a political deputy. Should it be the highest-ranking 
European External Action Service (EEAS) official, or can the HR also 
appoint ad-hoc Foreign Ministers of a Member State or Commissioners 
to represent her at a political level? While the Treaty is silent on the 
issue, the early practice of Mrs Ashton pointed to the latter direction.10 
This choice may also have been inspired by the fact that only ministers 
can preside over a Foreign Affairs Council, but no EEAS official.
En revanche, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) contains a number of chapters dedicated to specific policy fields. 
These relate to the common commercial policy (Articles 206–207 TFEU), 
development cooperation (Articles 208–211 TFEU), economic, financial 
and technical cooperation with third countries (Articles 212–213 TFEU) 
and humanitarian aid (Article 214 TFEU). In addition, each internal 
policy of the European Union has an external dimension under Article 
3(2) TFEU and the case law of the Court.11 Accordingly, the Union also 
pursues external activities in fields such as transport, the protection of 
 8 J Wouters and T Ramopoulos, ‘Revisiting the Lisbon Treaty’s Constitutional Design 
of EU External Relations’, in LS Rossi and F Casolari (eds), The EU after Lisbon (Springer 
2014) 215, 219.
 9 Kaddous (n 7) 207.
10 Wouters and Ramopoulos (n 8) 228.
11 For an excellent comprehensive overview of the recent case law on implied competence 
see F Erlbacher, ‘Recent Case Law on External Competences of the European Union: How 
Member States Can Embrace Their Own Treaty’, CLEER Papers 2017/2, 24.
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the environment or migration, just to name a few. In all these non-CFSP 
areas (or integrated external policies), the European Commission 
ensures the external representation of the Union. This fundamental 
division between CFSP and non-CFSP is expressly laid down in Article 
17(1) 5th sentence TEU: ‘With the exception of the common foreign 
and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties,12 it 
[the Commission] shall ensure the Union’s external representation.’ 
Inside the Commission, the function of the Vice-President is reserved to 
the High Representative (Article 17(5) TEU), but the President can also 
attribute external relations portfolios to other Commissioners (Article 
17(6)(b) TEU). In practice, no fewer than three individuals usually 
take up the roles of Trade Commissioner, Development Cooperation 
Commissioner and Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement. 
Moreover, not even the title Vice-President is reserved for the High 
Representative. The Commission President continued to appoint several 
Vice-Presidents. Currently, Mr Juncker has even given diplomatic 
precedence to ‘First Vice-President’ Timmermans over the current High 
Representative, Mogherini. She is but a simple Vice-President, albeit a 
constitutionally guaranteed one.
Given that the internal set-up remained quite different between 
CFSP and non-CFSP, it becomes important to delineate the two 
areas. However, the Treaty is less clear on this crucial aspect. In the 
old, pre-Lisbon version of Article 40 TEU, the Treaty ‘protected’ the 
integrated policies against an encroachment from inter-governmental 
CFSP action. Thus, in the famous small arms case, the Court of 
Justice was able to adjudicate whether the content and the objective 
of a measure would fall in the EU’s development policy or the CFSP.13 
With the Treaty of Lisbon, this delineation has become more difficult 
for two reasons. First, Article 40(1) TEU got complemented by a 
second paragraph, according to which the implementation of integrated 
policies should not affect CFSP-action (Article 40(2) TEU). This new 
‘protection’ put CFSP and non-CFSP policies on the same legal level. 
Hence, the former ‘in dubio pro communitate’ rule was abolished. 
Second, Article 21 TEU contains nowadays general objectives for its 
entire spectrum of external action. When an objective in the list clearly 
refers to CFSP (international peace and security) or integrated policies 
12 This other area relates to the external representation of the Eurozone under Article 
138(2) TFEU, a special topic that will not be dealt with in this article.
13 Case C-91/05, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European 
Union [2008] ECR I-03651 EU:C:2008:288 with case note by Hillion and Wessels in (2009) 
46 CML Rev 551.
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(trade, development or humanitarian aid), the aim of the measure 
could still help in the delimitation exercise.14 However, the remaining 
objectives apply to several areas alike. Accordingly, one cannot say that, 
for example, the pursuance of a human rights objective is characteristic 
of either a CFSP or a non-CFSP act. It should guide both acts. This, in 
turn, makes it difficult to deduce from a given act’s objective whether or 
not it falls into the area of CFSP or into an integrated policy.
Against that background, the delimitation must foremost look 
at the content of an act.15 Typically, acts that are related to trade or 
development cooperation will not qualify as falling into the CFSP. 
But when trying to define what ‘foreign’ policy may entail, caution 
is needed. Whereas military measures and those that relate to the 
external security of the Union will usually fall within the ambit of the 
CFSP, measures to strengthen international peace and security will 
depend on their precise form. If they are of an economic, financial or 
technical support nature, they can be based on the so-called Stability 
Instrument,16 an EU regulation that is itself based on Articles 207 and 
212 TFEU. Luckily, this distinction remains largely internal, though. It 
is precisely with respect to this kind of action, where the ‘double’ hat of 
the High Representative comes into play. Under his ‘Commission hat’ he 
can initiate the programming of such measures17 and under his ‘CFSP 
hat’ he can use the instrument in his external political dialogues with 
the partner country or region in question.
2.2 the significance of the diplomatic level
An additional complication arises when moving up the diplomatic 
ladder. While the delimitation between CFSP and non-CFSP remains 
intact also at presidential level, the ‘double-hatting’ does not. 
Rather, inside the Commission the task of representing the EU for 
non-CFSP matters is vested in the President of the Commission (from 
2009–14 Mr Barroso, currently Mr Juncker), whereas the President of 
the Council (from 2009–14 Mr van Rompuy, currently Mr Tusk) ensures 
the external representation of the Union on CFSP matters (Article 15(6) 
TEU) ‘without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative’.
14 Wouters and Ramopoulos (n 8) 219.
15 F Hoffmeister, Commentary on Article 212 TFEU, Point 13, in Grabitz and Hilf, EU-
Kommentar, 55th Ergänzungslieferung, Beck 2014.
16 Council Regulation (EU) Nr 230/2014, OJ 2014, L77/1.
17 Inside the Commission, a Directorate on Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) is entrusted 
to the High Representative/Vice President (HRVP) to that effect.
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Not surprisingly, this parallel regime at the highest level led to 
some rivalries and power struggles.18 While the delimitation between 
CFSP and non-CFSP matters may work in certain areas, it does not 
when it comes to summits in which a couple of cross-cutting issues are 
discussed. In theory, the two Presidents would both attend the same 
meeting and agree in advance who speaks on which agenda point. In 
practice, this is difficult to achieve as EU attendance may be limited and 
topics may evolve in a given discussion. So, van Rompuy and Barroso 
struck a deal in March 2010 over how to roughly cope with their 
external representative tasks.19
In EU summits with third countries, both Presidents would attend. 
As political issues are normally higher in priority for such bilateral talks, 
Mr van Rompuy would speak first on general lines. When the discussion 
would become more concrete and touch upon the economic relationship 
between the EU and that country, Mr Barroso (and his Commissioner 
for Trade, Mr De Gucht) could come in as well at a summit.20 Clearly, 
this rule of thumb gave Mr van Rompuy the diplomatic precedence on 
the bilateral international scene.
The two Presidents also turn up together in important interna-
tional fora. This is the case for both the G20 meetings21 and for the G7/
G8 meetings.22 Only the preparatory work is divided somehow. For G20 
meetings, the Diplomatic Advisor of the Council President (Cabinet) 
is in the lead, while the preparatory work at this level for the G7/G8 
is done by the Commission President’s Economic Adviser (sherpa). A 
particular challenge here is to coordinate with the sherpas of other 
G7 Member States (Germany, France, UK, Italy), to make sure that 
European leaders speak roughly in the same direction at least on issues 
that fall into the EU’s exclusive or shared competence.
18 For an early report about some friction between the two Presidents, see Bruno 
Waterfield, ‘The Two Rival Presidents Battling for Power Over the EU’ The Telegraph (9 
June 2011) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8566790/The-two-
rival-presidents-battling-for-power-over-the-EU.html.
19 Practical Arrangement between President Van Rompuy and President Barroso 
regarding External Representation of the European Union at Presidential Level (16 March 
2010), Centre for European Policy Studies, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International 
Relations and European Policy Centre, Joint Study, The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at 
the Institutional Innovations (2010) http://www.ceps.eu/book/treaty-lisbon-second-look-
institutional-innovations, Annex I, 78.
20 A more restricted set-up occurred at EU–China summits. Here, only the Presidents 
were allowed to take the floor on either side.
21 In the last two G20 meetings in Turkey (November 2015) and China (September 
2016), both Mr Tusk (Council President) and Mr Juncker (Commission President) 
represented the EU.
22 In the last two G7 meetings in Germany (June 2015) and Japan (May 2016), both 
Mr Tusk (Council President) and Mr Juncker (Commission President) represented the EU.
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2.3 the tension between policy-making and representation
This latter observation leads us directly to the next point. It is not 
enough to sort out who actually represents the European Union interna-
tionally, but also to define what is said there.
In this regard, the Treaty is relatively precise in the CFSP area. 
Under Article 26(2) TEU the Council shall ‘take the decisions necessary 
for defining and implementing’ the CFSP, whereas the policy is only 
‘put into effect’ by the HR (Article 26(3) TEU). This system establishes 
a clear principal–agent relationship. First, the Council decides on the 
policy content, and then the HR carries it out. Clearly, there are certain 
margins of manoeuvre for the HR to determine the details of the policy 
and for updating it in view of changed circumstances. Moreover, the 
personality of the High Representative also plays a role – the first holder 
of the office (pre-Lisbon), Mr Solana, seems to have used the available 
space more actively than his successor (post-Lisbon), Mrs Ashton. But 
the starting point is clear: without a Council CFSP decision backing him, 
the HR cannot represent the EU. That, in turn, may lead to the absence 
of the EU in the international scene. This vacuum may then either be 
filled by the Member States bilaterally or remain. In the latter case, the 
rest of the world will understand that the particular issue is indeed of 
no European interest at all.
In the non-CFSP field, the dividing line between policy-making and 
external representation is somehow similar. Under Article 16(1) 2nd 
sentence TEU, the Council shall carry out ‘policy-making’. According 
to Article 16(6) 3rd subparagraph TEU, it is again the Council that 
‘shall elaborate the Union’s external action’ (on the basis of strategic 
guidelines from the European Council, which have, however, never 
been adopted in practice). But the wording is different. The treaty 
does not require formal ‘decisions’, like in the CFSP field. Rather, 
it talks about the ‘elaboration’ of the Union’s external action. That 
means that certain policy guidance can be given to the Commission 
as external representative. The form thereof is left to the discretion of 
the institutions: the Council can issue formal Council conclusions, or 
it can adopt working party papers that are never published. It is also 
possible to simply discuss a topic between Member States delegates 
in the presence of the Commission without ever taking a consolidated 
Council view at all. In all cases, the Commission shall then ‘represent’ 
the EU within the broad policy parameters set by the Council under 
Article 16(1) TEU.
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3. The scope of representation
While Articles 16 and 17 TEU hence give a general indication on the 
institutional balance between the two institutions on non-CFSP matters, 
the precise delimitation has again become subject to intensive debate. 
Interestingly, a number of those inter-institutional battles also reached 
the European Court of Justice. It is thus helpful to summarize briefly 
the state of the art with respect to three typical acts: international treaty 
negotiations, political memoranda of understandings and submissions 
before international courts.
3.1 international treaty negotiations
For international agreements, following another recommendation of 
the Convention’s Working Group,23 the Lisbon Treaty only foresees one 
set of provisions (Articles 216–218 TFEU) for both CFSP and non-CFSP 
agreements. This replaced the previous system, where CFSP agreements 
were dealt with under ex-Article 24 TEU and all other agreements 
under ex-Article 300 TEC. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the typical course 
of action is as follows.
First, based on a recommendation by the future chief negotiator, the 
Council authorizes the opening of negotiations (Article 218(2) TFEU). 
For agreements that relate exclusively or principally to the CFSP, it will 
appoint the HR as head of the Union’s negotiating team. For non-CFSP 
agreements, this role will be assumed by the Commission (Article 218(3) 
TFEU). Second, the chief negotiator will conduct the negotiations in line 
with the Council’s negotiating directives. The Council will also designate 
a special committee in consultations with which the negotiations must 
be conducted (Article 218(4) TFEU). The negotiation directives are 
guidelines that serve to convey to the negotiator the general objectives 
which the latter must endeavour to achieve in negotiations.24 However, 
they cannot empower the Special Committee to impose substantive EU 
positions on the chief negotiator as that would go beyond the consul-
tative functions of the former.25 Rather, the chief negotiator can only 
be asked to regularly inform the Council about the progress of the 
negotiations.26 This clarification makes sure that the Council does not 
23 European Convention (n 3), Recommendation No 12, 9.
24 Case C-245/13, European Commission v Council of the European Union, EU:C:2015:174, 
Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of 17 March 2015, para 71.
25 Case C-245/13, European Commission v Council of the European Union, EU:C:2015:483, 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 July 2015, paras 85–97.
26 ibid paras 60–84.
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over-extend its policy-making prerogative by prescribing every detail to 
the chief negotiator. In a similar vein, the chief negotiator has the duty to 
fully and immediately inform the European Parliament about all stages 
of the negotiations under Article 218(10) TFEU. Importantly, this duty 
relates to both CFSP and non-CFSP agreements in the same way.27
Finally, once the negotiations are concluded, the Council will 
take a decision on signature under Article 218(5) TFEU and conclusion 
(ratification) after having involved the European Parliament under 
Article 218(6) TFEU. Unfortunately, even the detail about signature 
is not clear. In the Council’s practice, it often empowers the rotating 
Council presidency to designate ‘a person’ to sign an EU agreement. 
In practice, this person is often a Minister or the Ambassador of the 
presidency itself. However, as the Council presidency has no role in the 
external representation of the EU anymore, such a self-designation does 
not make sense. Rather, it should be common sense for the Council to 
authorize right away the chief negotiator of the treaty (the HR or the 
Commission) to also sign it.
The above-mentioned system relates to EU agreements with third 
states. However, in EU practice there are many situations where the 
substance of an agreement goes beyond EU powers and touches upon 
Member State competence as well. In those instances, both the EU 
and its Member States will become party to the agreement – so-called 
‘mixed agreements’. This cas de figure then also has consequences for 
external representation. Theoretically, each Member State could well 
represent itself for the relevant ‘national’ part of the agreement. In 
extremis this would bring the EU negotiating team to 29 persons: the 
EU chief negotiator and 28 representatives from EU Member States. 
In practice, this is regularly avoided, though. Representatives of the 
Member States, united in the Council, will appoint a common negotiator 
of their choice instead. This representative can be the Commission, the 
High Representative or even a representative from the rotating Council 
presidency. It follows that for mixed agreements, the external represen-
tation may differ on a case-by-case basis. In the best case scenario, the 
Member States will opt for the same institution that is already the EU 
chief negotiator (i.e. the HR for CFSP agreements and the Commission 
27 ECJ, Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, 
EU.C:2014:2015, para 85; ECJ, Case C-263/14, Parliament v Council, Judgment of 14 June 
2016, para 68. In both cases, the Court upheld Article 37 TEC as the correct legal basis for 
EU agreements with Mauritius and Tanzania on the transfer of suspected pirates caught by 
the EU military mission ‘Atalanta’ near the coast of Somalia, but found that the Council had 
not informed the Parliament of the progress and the conclusion of the negotiations with 
the third state in question.
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for non-CFSP agreements). That is the predominant practice in bilateral 
treaty negotiations with third states.28 In other cases, the representation 
may be divided between the EU chief negotiator and the representative 
from the rotating Presidency, who will have the duty to agree between 
themselves how to divide the practical work in a consistent way. This 
happens more in a multilateral context.
3.2  political Memoranda of understanding
Questions of institutional balance are also at stake when it comes 
to the negotiation and signing of non-binding agreements, so-called 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). As the Treaty does not contain 
specific provisions in this regard, guidance must come from Articles 16 
and 17 TEU. Here, the recent case about the financial contribution of 
Switzerland to the economic and social cohesion in an enlarged Union 
is illustrative. Following the respective enlargements of the European 
Union in 2004 and 2007, Switzerland agreed to pay a lump sum to 
compensate for the fact that it now had access to a much broader 
internal market than before. The level of these payments was agreed 
with the EU through a MoU. In 2006 (for the then 10 new Member 
States) and in 2008 (for Bulgaria and Romania), such MoUs were signed 
for the EU by both the President of the Council and the Commission, 
respectively. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the 
Commission insisted to sign the next MoU in 2013 (for Croatia) alone. 
The Council took issue with this new practice and challenged it before 
the Court as a breach of the inter-institutional balance under Article 
13(2) TEU. Interestingly, though, the Council did not argue that it was 
empowered to grant co-signature to a representative of the Presidency. 
Instead, and more cautiously, it argued that the Commission signature 
should not have occurred without prior authorization of the Council. 
The Court agreed with this analysis, holding that the Commission’s 
powers of external representation under Article 17(1) TEU do not 
include the signature of a non-binding MoU.29 Rather, the decision to 
sign or not requires an assessment of the Union’s interest in line with 
the constitutional requirements under the EU’s external objectives in 
Articles 21(1) and (2) TEU. Such assessment involves policy-making 
28 F Hoffmeister, ‘Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the 
European Union and Its Member States’, in C Hillion and P Koutrakos, Mixed Agreements 
Revisited (Hart 2010) 249, 253–4.
29 Case C-660/13, Council of the European Union v European Commission, Judgment of 
the Court of Justice of 28 July 2016, para 38.
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which falls under the Council’s prerogatives in Articles 16(1) and (6) 
TEU.30 Accordingly, the Court annulled the Commission’s decision to 
sign the MoU.
It follows from this judgment that the legal framework for MoUs 
is largely comparable to the one for binding agreements. The Council 
should authorize their negotiation and signature, while the Commission 
should negotiate and actually sign.31 The most important difference 
relates to the Parliament. For binding agreements, the European 
Parliament must either be consulted or give consent under Article 
218(6) TFEU, while there is no parliamentary role for MoUs.
3.3 submissions before foreign and international courts
Another important type of representation is the conduct of judicial 
litigation. For cases before the European Court of Justice, the rule is 
simple. Each institution represents itself and defends its own action and 
interests. However, these are cases of internal representation before the 
highest European Court. In neither of those cases may an institution 
speak for the ‘European Union’ as a representative of the Union as 
whole. Rather, this role can only be played in international litigation 
before foreign or international courts.
Since its inception, the Treaties gave the Commission the role 
to represent the then Community before national Courts of the 
Member States (ex-Article 282 TEC). Today, this provision forms part 
of the Lisbon Treaty as well (Article 335 2nd sentence TFEU). While 
the wording was restricted to representation in domestic situations, 
the Commission always argued that it could represent the Community 
also before foreign courts by analogy. This point of view was accepted 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).32 Accordingly, the Commission 
submitted amicus curiae briefs on matters relating to the internal market 
or competition law before mostly American courts to defend European 
interests. Exceptionally, such briefs would also cover international 
law, touching issues such as universal civil jurisdiction33 or corporate 
30 ibid paras 39–40.
31 As noted above (section 2.3), the legal rule for signing binding agreements is that 
the negotiator alone should sign an EU agreement, although, in practice, the Council 
still empowers the Presidency to designate a person (which in practice turns out to be a 
Presidency representative) to sign on behalf of the Union. The current writer believes that 
this practice is not in line with the Treaty.
32 Case C-131/03 P; Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, EU:C:2006:541, 
Judgment of the Court, para 94.
33 See the brief of the European Commission in the Sosa v Alvarez Machain case before 
the US Supreme Court (2004) 542 US 692, with a discussion in Donald Francis Donovan
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responsibility for human rights violations.34 In these international law 
cases, however, individual Member States would claim the right to 
submit briefs on the same topic at the same time. This happened in 
both the Sosa (brief of the UK, together with Australia and Switzerland 
(!)) and the Kiobel interventions (individual briefs from the UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany) before the US Supreme Court. Apparently, 
these governments thought that those issues of international law fell 
within the CFSP. Consequently, they intervened in their own name 
as any EU position in the field would not prejudice their right to act 
in international fora. For the Commission, though, the aspects were 
having a direct effect on the business of European companies abroad, 
falling under its trade and external economic policy.35 In such a scenario 
an additional intervention of a Member State on a topic already covered 
by the EU is not admissible. In any case, even if the issue was to be 
qualified as being predominantly of foreign policy, Member States 
would have to align their positions in substance with the EU brief under 
the duty of loyalty enshrined in Article 24(3) TEU. Such loyalty had 
been exercised at least once before, namely on the question of the death 
penalty for mentally disabled persons in the US. Arguably, that was a 
true CFSP topic, as it did not concern EU companies or citizens, but the 
application of international human rights law towards US citizens. Here, 
the Council of the EU submitted an amicus brief in the Atkins case36 for 
the European Union in 2002 – and the Member States did not concur or 
dissent with individual briefs. A similar approach was also taken on the 
question of the death penalty for juveniles in Roper v Simmons.37 Again, 
the Council submitted a consolidated brief on behalf of the EU (together 
with the Council of Europe and seven other individual countries) to 
the US Supreme Court. After Lisbon, the situation has changed with 
respect to external representation, though. If the topic for an interven-
tion before foreign courts would nowadays relate to the CFSP, such 
briefs could not be filed by the Council anymore, but would have to be 
submitted by the High Representative.
and Anthea Roberts, ‘The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction’ (2006) 100 
AJIL 142.
34 See the brief of the European Union on the Kiobel case before the US Supreme Court 
(Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (2013) 133 SCt 1659 with annotation by I Wuerth 
(2013) 113 AJIL 601).
35 For a critical assessment of the Commission’s reasoning on its standing in the 
Sosa amicus, see the European Commission’s amicus brief in the Alvarez Machain case; 
online paper from the University of Leuven (2004) https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/
onderzoek/opinies/CRamicuscuriaeILForum.pdf.
36 Atkins v Virginia (2002) 536 US 304.
37 Roper v Simmons (2005) 543 US 551.
14 europe anD the WorlD :  a laW revieW
When turning to international litigation before international 
courts, the situation is no less complicated. Being a member of the 
WTO and a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, the EU can 
become a plaintiff or defendant. It can even make submissions before 
the International Court of Justice under certain circumstances.38 
However, it was again less certain how these acts of international 
representation are organized internally in the Union. In constant 
practice, the Commission took the floor for the Union before the 
WTO, UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies, the European Court of 
Human Rights, or – more recently – ICSID investment tribunals. 
It also formulated the positions inside the house, without asking 
the Council for prior approval. This practice came under scrutiny 
of the Council in particular when the Commission submitted a 
brief on an advisory opinion sought by the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission from the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.39 Here, the 
Commission had decided to intervene in August 2013. It discussed and 
revised the broad substance in the Council Working Party in October 
and November, and submitted the final brief to ITLOS at the end of 
November. The Council felt that it was entitled to prior approval of 
the EU statement and brought an action before the Court of Justice to 
annul the Commission’s decision. The Luxemburg judges clarified three 
important points. First, they confirmed the Commission’s position that 
Article 355 TFEU embodies the general principle that the EU has legal 
capacity and is to be represented, to that end, by the Commission. 
Accordingly, the Commission can also represent the EU before interna-
tional courts.40 Second, the Court dismissed the Council’s arguments 
in favour of prior approval. Submitting a brief ‘before’ an international 
tribunal could not be equated with taking an EU position ‘in’ an inter-
national body which takes decisions with legal effect on the EU.41 Thus, 
Article 218(9) TFEU, which gives the Council the right to determine 
such EU positions, was not applicable. Moreover, the Commission 
had not encroached into policy-making under Article 16(1) TEU. Its 
brief only explained to ITLOS long-standing EU policy on IUU fishing, 
as enshrined in numerous internal EU legal acts, thereby respecting 
38 For an overview, see F Hoffmeister and P Ondrusek, ‘The European Community in 
International Litigation’ (2008) 61 Revue Héllenique de Droit Intl 205.
39 ITLOS Case No 21.
40 Case C-73/14, Council of the European Union v European Commission, Judgment of 6 
October 2015, paras 58–9.
41 ibid paras 63–7.
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the Council’s prerogatives on policy-making.42 Third, the Court also 
emphasized that the Commission was obliged under Article 13(2) TEU 
to ‘consult’ the Council prior to its submission. This duty of sincere 
cooperation had been respected, though, because the Commission 
had discussed and revised its statement with the competent Council 
Working Party ahead of its final submission.43
It follows that there is a clear-cut division of labour for interna-
tional briefs. The Commission prepares the substance of the brief and 
consults the Council prior to its actual intervention. The substance of 
the brief should then duly reflect agreed EU policies, as laid down in 
internal legal acts, policy documents or as reflected in the discussions 
in Council on the matter. One commentator has advanced the view, 
though, that these European Court of Justice (ECJ) findings should only 
apply for proceedings before an international court whose outcome is 
not legally binding on the EU. He argued that only the Council could 
take a new and substantial obligation for the EU under international 
law.44 This is not convincing. Every international judicial body decides 
on the basis of pre-established obligations duly ratified by the EU. An 
international ruling would interpret and apply them, but not create new 
obligations. Similarly, a Commission urging the international court to 
apply or interpret the existing EU obligation in one way or the other 
would not create a new substantive legal obligation either. Accordingly, 
the findings of the ECJ in the ITLOS advisory opinion case are also 
applicable for other international briefs. Hence, they will have some 
spill-over effect on the Commission practice in human rights, trade 
and investment cases, where the prior consultation of Council had not 
always been carried out.
3.4 statements in bilateral meetings and international fora
The bread and butter of international diplomacy are statements in 
bilateral meetings or in international fora. For this activity, Article 
221(1) TFEU makes the straightforward point that ‘Union delegations 
in third countries and at international organisations shall represent 
the Union’. These delegations are placed under the overall authority of 
the HR (Article 221(2) TFEU). This also suggests that the HR has the 
internal power to instruct the Union delegations about when and what to 
42 ibid paras 68–77.
43 ibid paras 84–90.
44 See D Engbrink, ‘The European Union’s External Action: Coherence in European 
Foreign Policy Despite Separate Legal Orders?’ (2017) 44(1) LIEEI 5, 38–9.
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say, if appropriate. Insofar as the topics relate to CFSP, this arrangement 
also makes sense: the Union delegations are just mirroring the power of 
the HR itself to represent the Union externally on CFSP matters.
But what is the situation for non-CFSP matters? The answer is 
that the external representation does not change. It was a clear decision 
of the Lisbon Treaty to upgrade the former Commission delegations to 
fully fledged Union delegations. Accordingly, the delegations are also 
empowered to represent the Union on non-CFSP matters under Article 
221(1) TFEU. However, the internal instructions for those issues will 
not come from the HR. Rather, as laid down in the decision estab-
lishing the EEAS, the relevant Commissioners and their services in the 
headquarters can give binding instructions to the delegations in their 
respective area of competence.45
While this matter has been sorted out between the actors, the 
situation is less satisfactory for ‘mixed’ statements. This relates to 
situations often seen in international organizations, where a topic may 
not only touch upon EU matters, but also ‘national’ matters. Some 
Member States, in particular the United Kingdom, insisted in 2011 that 
such statements should not be made ‘on behalf of the EU’, but also ‘on 
behalf of its Member States’. Lacking such an opening formula the UK 
went so far as blocking a number of EU statements in multilateral fora.46 
The issue was then brought to the attention of the Council, which issued 
in October 2011 a ‘General Arrangement’ on ‘EU statements in multi-
lateral organisations’.47 Under Point 4, 2nd bullet thereof, positions 
common to the EU and its Member States should be made ‘on behalf of 
the EU and its Member States’, whereas issues relating to the exercise of 
national competences should be made ‘on behalf of the Member States’ 
when the Member States agree to collective representation by an EU 
actor.
While this part of the text as such follows the logic of ‘mixity’, 
the Council also added the observation in Point 3, 5th bullet, that 
Member States ‘agree on a case by case basis whether and how to 
co-ordinate and be represented externally’. They may request ‘EU 
actors or a Member State, notably the Member State holding the 
rotating Presidency of the Council, to do so on their behalf’. While 
45 Article 5(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organization and 
functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010, L201/30.
46 European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22/12/2011, para 17.
47 Council of the European Union, Doc 15901/11 of 24/10/2011, reprinted in Kuijper 
and Wouters et al, The Law of EU External Relations (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 38–9.
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Member States are indeed free to appoint whomever to represent them 
in an area of exclusive national competence, going for the Presidency 
seems to be against the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty: if there is merit in 
speaking with one voice also on those matters for 28 Member States, 
why not appoint the EU actor straightaway? This is all the more logical 
when dealing with an area of shared EU competence, which has not 
yet been exercised at EU level. Such an area is already conferred on 
the European Union by the treaty, albeit its exercise is only potential. 
In such a situation of (non-exercised) shared competence, the Member 
States should confine the external representation to an EU actor (and 
not the rotating Presidency).
Finally, specific situations may arise when the EU has internal 
competence on a subject matter discussed in an international forum, 
but is neither member nor observer in that very forum. In this situation, 
the Court has reminded the EU Member States that they cannot simply 
deny the EU dimension. When the international forum takes decisions 
binding on the EU, the Council shall internally prepare the EU position 
under Article 218(9) TFEU upon a proposal for the Commission. That 
EU position can then externally be represented by the Member States 
acting jointly in the interest of the Union.48 Member States will then act 
as trustees of the Union in accordance with the pre-established position 
of the Union.49
4. Recent practice in the common foreign 
and security policy
Turning to recent practice, we will now review two CFSP examples. 
The first relates to the multilateral negotiations with Iran on its atomic 
programme. Here, the role of the HR in representing the EU is largely 
acknowledged. It is hence interesting to review in more detail how the 
HR ‘came into play’ and how it exercised its powers. Second, we will 
look at the diplomatic efforts of the EU to reduce tensions between 
Russia and the Ukraine. In this bilateral conflict in the EU’s neighbour-
hood, Germany and France were much more visible than the EU as a 
48 Case C-399/12, Federal Republic of Germany v Council (OIV), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, 
para 51 with a lucid commentary by I Govaere, ‘Novel Issues Pertaining to EU Member 
States Membership of Other International Organisations: The OIV Case’ in I Govaere et 
al, The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Martin Nijhoff 
Publishers 2013) 225–43.
49 Erlbacher (n 11) 14.
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whole. Conversely, that example may give some idea which factors play 
a role in preventing a stronger role for the HR.
4.1 iran
The diplomatic efforts on containing Iranian nuclear activities spread 
over roughly 15 years. We will concentrate here on the institutional 
dimension of the EU’s role. For this purpose, it is useful to divide the 
years 2002–16 into three main phases.
4.1.1  The launch of negotiations and the first involvement of the HR
Initially, after first signs of Iranian nuclear activity had been detected 
in Natanz, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under 
its Director-General El-Baradei started to investigate the matter in 
August 2002. In May 2003, Iran informed the IAEA of its intention 
to construct the Iran nuclear research reactor, claiming that the use 
of uranium would be entirely peaceful. However, it soon turned out 
that with its limited powers the IAEA could not properly monitor 
Iranian activities on the ground. Following a critical report of 
El-Baradei to the IAEA board of governors in June 2003,50 the 
governments of France, Germany and the UK thus started diplomatic 
efforts directly with the Iranian government. The three European 
governments could not see any identifiable civilian purpose of the 
programme and wanted to back the IAEA. Their foreign ministers 
Straw, de Villepin and Fischer thus sent a joint letter to their Iranian 
counterpart in August 2003.51
This initiative of the E-3 was met with some positive response 
in Teheran – Iran agreed to a joint statement on 23 October 2003 on 
the voluntary suspension of enrichment activities52 and actually did so 
according to the testimony of a high-ranking French official.53 The IAEA 
was entrusted to follow the situation closely and monitor in particular 
the scope of the suspension.
50 IAEA, Report by the Director General (6 June 2003) GOV/2003/40.
51 Gary Samore, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (International 
Institute for Strategic Studies/Routledge 2005) 18.
52 Iran declaration of 23 October 2003 from the three Foreign Ministers and the Iranian 
Foreign Minister, retrieved via the BBC (2003) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/3211036.stm.
53 G Araud, Ambassador of France to the US, at the time of the initiation of the 
negotiations the director for strategic affairs in France, in Atlantic Council (2015), ‘Europe 
and the Iran Nuclear Deal’, transcript from a conference held in Washington on 26 May 
2005 www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/europe-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal, 1st 
intervention, 5th para.
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At the same time, inside the EU, there was a perception by other 
Member States that they should be informed about the diplomatic 
activities of the Big Three. It appears that Paris had been the leading 
power behind the original initiative – and it had chosen Berlin as its 
close ally and London also as a proxy for Washington, which did not 
have diplomatic relations with Iran at the time. Moreover, a close coor-
dination between the three powers was thought to be essential after the 
intra-EU division on the American invasion of Iraq – which had been 
supported by the UK, but opposed by Germany and France. But from 
the viewpoint of other capitals, these valid considerations should not 
absolve them from updating them in regular intervals as EU partners. 
Against that background, the then High Representative Javier Solana 
claimed a role to represent the EU at the negotiation table as of 2004. His 
efforts were successful – in the Paris Agreement of 15 November 2004, 
his involvement was officially acknowledged. The opening paragraphs of 
that text read:
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with 
the support of the High Representative of the European Union (E3/
EU), reaffirm the commitments in the Tehran Agreed Statement of 
21 October 2003 and have decided to move forward, building on 
that agreement. The E3/EU and Iran reaffirm their commitment 
to the NPT. The E3/EU recognise Iran’s rights under the NPT 
exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, 
without discrimination. (…).54
Importantly, this did not mean a substitution of the Big Three. 
Rather, the format was enlarged from ‘E3’ to ‘E3/EU’ (Germany, France, 
UK and the HR).
4.1.2  The deadlock in negotiations and the consolidation of the HR’s 
role
With the election of Mr Ahmadinejad as President of Iran in June 
2005, the progress achieved so far was put back. In August that year, 
Iran notified the IEAE of its intentions to resume its nuclear activities, 
and in September the IAEA found the country not to comply with its 
54 IAEA, Communication dated 26 November 2004 Received from the Permanent 
Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom 
concerning the Agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004 (26 November 2004), 
INFCIRC/637, 3–4.
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non-proliferation obligations.55 Moreover, Ahmadinejad provoked the 
international community with the break of IAEA seals on the Natanz 
facility in January 2006. This made the E3/EU change the international 
format. In order to increase the pressure, they enlarged the negotiation 
group with other permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
Formally, the IAEA seized the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
in March 2006. The French foreign minister Douste-Blazy proposed 
a new format, including the US, Russia, China, UK, France plus 
Germany. After these states had agreed on a new package proposal in 
Vienna,56 HR Solana transmitted it to Iran in June 2006 on their behalf. 
However, the proposal received a cold shower in Teheran.57 In turn, 
the Security Council then urged Iran to stop its uranium enrichment-
related and reprocessing activities under Article 40 of the Charter. §4 
of Resolution 1696 (2005) read:58
(The Security Council) Endorses, in this regard, the proposals of 
China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European 
Union’s High Representative, for a long-term comprehensive 
arrangement which would allow for the development of relations 
and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the estab-
lishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful 
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
The new group format then received two diplomatic abbrevia-
tions. From the UN perspective, it was the P5 + 1, indicating that it 
consisted of the five permanent members of the Security Council and 
Germany. From the EU perspective, it was the enlarged format of the 
previous E3/EU format, thus becoming EU/E3 + 3. The difference was 
not only semantic. While the UN abbreviation would just refer to six UN 
Member States, the EU formula would indicate with the notion EU/E3 
that also the EU as such was part of the talks. A plain counting of actors 
55 IAEA, Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005 (24 September 2005), GOV/2005/ 
77, 2–3.
56 Elements of a Proposal to Iran as Approved on 1 June 2006 at the Meeting in Vienna 
of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States 
of America and the European Union. The text is reproduced in the Annex to the letter dated 
25 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council, S/2006/521, 
2–4.
57 Islamic Republic of Iran’s response to the package presented on June 6, 2006 http://
www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranresponse.pdf.
58 UNSC Resolution 1696 (2005) of 31 July 2006, §4.
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would bring the format to seven persons, not six. Moreover, with the 
reversed order of EU/E3 instead of the former E3/EU another upgrade 
of the HR’s role was implicit.
And indeed, the EU description of the evolving new format proved 
to be more accurate in subsequent practice. On the basis of UNSC 
Resolution 1696, Mr Solana consolidated the HR’s role in the talks. 
Following two more Security Council Resolutions in December 200659 
and March 2007,60 he started one-on-one meetings with the Iranian 
chief negotiator. He first met Mr Larijani in Ankara (April 2007)61 and 
in Lisbon (June 2007).62 However, Ahmadinejad then replaced the 
moderate Larijani by Mr Jalili and the attempts came to a standstill. 
Importantly, the UNSC supported the HR’s activity in March 2008. In 
§14 of its resolution 1803, it encouraged
the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in 
support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated 
solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, 
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States 
with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks.63
Despite this backing, a Solana trip to Teheran (June 2008)64 and 
contacts between the EU/E3+3 with Jalili in Geneva (July 200865 and 
October 200966) were to no avail.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Mrs Ashton 
replaced Mr Solana in his office at the end of 2009. The new HR took 
59 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1737 (27 December 2006) S/RES/1737, 
para 18.
60 ibid.
61 Council of the European Union, summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the meeting with Dr Ali Larijani, 
Secretary-General of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (2007) S130/07.
62 Council of the European Union, summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy after the meeting with Ali Larijani, 
Secretary-General of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (2007) S188/07.
63 UNSC Resolution 1803 (2008) of 13 March 2008, para 14.
64 Council of the European Union, summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High 
Representative for the CFSP, at the press conference in Tehran (14 June 2008) S211/08.
65 Glenn Kessler, ‘Iran Nuclear Talks End without Agreement’ The Washington Post (19 
July 2008) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/19/A R 2 0 
0 8 0 71900540.html.
66 Council of the European Union, introductory remarks by Javier Solana, EU High 
Representative for the CFSP, at the press conference in Geneva following his meeting with 
Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (1 October 2009) 
S220/09.
22 europe anD the WorlD :  a laW revieW
cautious steps to upgrade her contacts with the Iranian side. Following 
a direct UNSC request in June 2010 to resume negotiations,67 she 
delivered her first statements in EU/E3+3 talks with Jalili in December 
2010 in Geneva68 and January 2011 in Istanbul.69 But also a new set of 
meetings in 2002 (Istanbul,70 Baghdad,71 Moscow72) failed. In October 
2012 the EU widened the scope of its restrictive measures against Iran 
due to a lack of progress in the talks.73
4.1.3  The closing of negotiations and the leading role of the HR
With the takeover by Mr Rouhani as President of Iran in August 2013, 
the final phase started. In October that year, first very detailed technical 
discussions took place. The HR was now in the driving seat and seized 
the momentum. In particular, she managed to create a good relation-
ship with the new Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, whom she proposed 
to bring into the talks personally.74 Following two intensive rounds in 
Geneva between the EU/E3+3 and Iran in Geneva, the breakthrough 
was reached, when the two sides agreed on a Joint Plan of Action 
in November 2013.75 Under the Plan,76 Iran committed to freeze its 
enrichment activities and reduce the stockpiling of enriched uranium. 
The Plan established a Joint Commission and entrusted the IAEA to 
67 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1929 (9 June 2010) S/RES/1929, para 33.
68 Council of the European Union, statement by EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on behalf of E3+3 after the talks with Iran, Geneva 6–7 December 2010 (7 
December 2010) A251/10.
69 Council of the European Union, statement by EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on behalf of E3+3 following the talks with Iran in Istanbul, 21 and 22 January 2011 
(22 January 2011) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/118915.pdf.
70 Council of the European Union, statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton 
on behalf of the E3+3 following the Talks with Iran, Istanbul, 14 April 2012 (14 April 
2012) A173/12.
71 Council of the European Union, statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative 
of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
Commission, following the talks of E3+3 with Iran in Baghdad (24 May 2012) A237/12.
72  Council of the European Union, statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton 
on behalf of E3+3 following the talks with Iran in Moscow (18–19 June 2012) https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131067.pdf.
73 Council of the European Union, ‘Iran: EU Strengthens Sanctions over Lack of Progress 
in Nuclear Talks’ (15 October 2012) 14803/12, Presse 422.
74 Gregor Peter Schmitz and Christoph Schult, ‘Iran Nuclear Talks: Europe’s Unsung 
Chief Diplomat’ Spiegel Online International (1 October 2013) http://www.spiegel.
de/international/world/catherine-ashton-excells-in-western-talks-on-iran-nuclear-
program-a-925514.html.
75 EEAS, Joint Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Iran 
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (24 November 2013) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2013/131124_02_en.pdf.
76 For a summary of the Joint Plan of Action of November 2013, see the EEAS fact sheet 
at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131219_02_en.pdf.
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verify the nuclear-related measures. This was carried out in good faith, 
and when Mrs Ashton had to leave office in October 2014, the parties 
were close to a final deal. In a meeting with Zarif in Vienna in November, 
though, the comprehensive settlement could not be reached. Rather, the 
two protagonists (Ashton speaking for the EU/E3+3) agreed to carry on 
with their diplomatic efforts until 30 June 2015.77
The EU Council thus asked Ashton to continue her diplomatic role, 
although the function of HR was now in the hands of Federica Mogherini. 
Curiously, the new HR thus appointed the previous HR as her diplomatic 
advisor on Iran!78 In reality, though, the continuity was assured by EEAS 
Political Director Helga Schmid, who also managed to receive the trust 
of her new superior. In spring 2015, Mrs Ashton silently left the stage, 
with the effect that Mrs Mogherini became formally in charge. Following 
an agreed outline of the deal from Lausanne (April), and almost 17 days 
of uninterrupted negotiations past the initial deadline of 30 June with 
the United States as a driving force, the final settlement was reached 
on 14 July 2015 in Vienna. This ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ 
was welcomed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2231.79 It is 
not a legally binding treaty, but a political MoU. Inside the EU (and 
more importantly: the United States), no ratification was hence needed. 
As Iran fully abided by its political commitments, the EU lifted all its 
nuclear-related financial sanctions in January 2016.80 A Joint Statement 
delivered by HR Mogherini and the Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif on 
this historic ‘Implementation’ Day81 basically confirmed that the High 
Representative had taken over the leading role in the EU/E3+3 format.
4.2 ukraine
With respect to the Ukraine, intense EU foreign policy efforts date 
back to the days of the Orange Revolution in late 2004. When protests 
culminated about election fraud of the 2nd round of presidential 
77 EEAS, Joint Statement by Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad 
Javad Zarif following the talks in Vienna (24 November 2014) http://eeas.europa.eu/
statements-eeas/2014/141124_02_en.htm.
78 EEAS, High Representative Federica Mogherini appoints Catherine Ashton as 
her Special Advisor for Iran talks (5 December 2014) http://eeas.europa.eu/state 
ments-eeas/2014/141205_04_en.htm.
79 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2231 (20 July 2015) S/RES/2231.
80 Council of the European Union, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Restrictive 
Measures (2016) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/iran/jcpoa- rest 
rict ive- measures/.
81 EEAS, Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian 
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (16 January 2016) http://eeas.europa.eu/state ments -eeas 
/2016/160115_01_en.htm.
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elections on 21 November, allegedly won by Prime Minister Yanukovych, 
a roundtable between the Ukrainian protagonists (President Kuchma, 
Yanukovych and his challenger Yushchenko) was organized with a 
number of international mediators. Interestingly, among them were the 
Polish President Kwasniewski, the Lithuanian President Adamkus and – 
for the European Union – HR Solana. Moreover, the Secretary-General 
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
Kubis, and the President of the Russian Duma, Gryzlov, participated. It 
appears that this ad-hoc format proved rather effective. While Gryzlov 
focused on stating strong Russia support for Yanukovych only and Kubis 
was limited due to diverse OSCE membership, Solana took on the role to 
bring in the institutional weight of the European Union with 25 foreign 
ministers watching him. In the view of the then US ambassador to the 
Ukraine, Pifer, Solana took a cautious approach, being sensitive to the 
Russian angle. He apparently did not want a misstep in Kiev which could 
complicate EU–Russian relations.82 This, in turn, left policy space for 
Kwasniewski to emerge as the most influential mediator in those talks, 
also benefiting from his pre-existing personal relationships with the 
Ukrainian players. Even though he was not formally representing the EU, 
his line was fully compatible with the EU’s objectives to find a peaceful 
solution that would allow free and fair elections to be conducted in the 
country. In the end, the roundtable agreed on 8 December to a change in 
the composition of the discredited Electoral Commission, a re-run of the 
second election round and broader constitutional reforms. That was a 
crucial step for peaceful change of government later on. After the re-run 
of the 2nd round on 26 December 2004, Victor Yushchenko emerged 
as the winner with 52 per cent of the vote and took office in January 
the following year, rather than Yanukovych, whose support stalled at 
44 per cent. To a certain degree, this successful turn in the democratic 
development of the country can also be attributed to the EU High 
Representative and the active part of the EU’s new Member States.83
In the post-Lisbon period, the EU became again very active in the 
Ukraine–Russia conflict 2013–15. Here, we can distinguish between 
three phases. In this case, though, the involvement of the HR does not 
increase, but goes back over time.
82 R Kosc-Harmatiy, European Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, the 
Wilson Centre 2011, quoting the former US Ambassador Pifer to Ukraine https://www.
wilsoncenter.org/publication/european-mediators-and-ukraines-orange-revolution.
83 For an interesting analysis see M Roth, ‘EU–Ukrainian Relations after the Orange 
Revolution: The Role of the New Member States’ (2007) 8(4) Perspectives on Eur Pol and 
Soc 505.
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4.2.1  The Russian intervention into Ukrainian affairs and early HR 
diplomatic efforts
At the EU summit with the six countries of the Eastern Partnership84 
in Vilnius in November 2013, the stage was set for the signature of the 
EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, including a deep and comprehen-
sive free trade agreement. The negotiations had been conducted for a 
long time, including under the pro-Russian President Yanukovych and 
his government. However, a couple of weeks before the summit, the 
Ukrainian leader changed his mind, most probably upon heavy pressure 
from Moscow. He refused to sign the text, which triggered political 
turmoil in Kiev. Demonstrations at the main square (Maidan) in the 
cold winter lasted longer than expected, and when Ukrainian security 
forces started to shoot at protesters on 22 January 2014 (condemned 
by the HR)85 the protesters demanded the departure of President 
Yanukovych altogether.
At that critical juncture, the 32nd EU–Russian summit was 
scheduled in Brussels on 28 January. The European Council President 
van Rompuy welcomed President Putin and had the following to say on 
Ukraine:
The European Union is closely following the developments in 
Ukraine and strongly condemns violence. We call for restraint. 
Those responsible have to be held to account. We want the 
fundamental freedoms – such as freedom of expression and of 
assembly – preserved. The present stalemate must be rapidly 
overcome through a genuine dialogue between the authorities, 
the opposition and civil society. The Ukrainian authorities have a 
special responsibility in this. It is crucial to find a way forward in 
the interest of the Ukrainian people. EU High Representative will be 
travelling to Kiev in a few hours. For our part, we are ready to move 
ahead and to sign and implement our association agreement, 
already initialled a year ago, provided the authorities confirm 
their adherence to a democratic Ukraine. The respect for sovereign 
countries’ freedom of choice on foreign policy, regional economic 
cooperation and trade is a fundamental right and a principle I 
stressed today once again.86
84 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
85 EEAS, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on violence and 
reported deaths of protesters in Kiev (22 January 2014) 140122/01.
86 European Council, remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy 
following the 32nd EU–Russia summit (28 January 2014) EUCO 27/14, Presse 23, PR PCE 
21 (emphasis added).
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However, Putin was not happy about the perspective of an 
EU emissary to Kiev. He bluntly told Lady Ashton (and Stefan Füle, 
the Enlargement Commissioner who accompanied her), not to get 
involved: ‘The more intermediaries there are, the more problems there 
are’.87 Nevertheless, Ashton and Füle went to Kiev on 31 January 
2014,88 and the HR also came back a second time in the week after89 
in an EU effort to mediate between the government and opposition.90 
However, when the situation came to the crunch, she was not in 
town. Rather, on 20 February she chaired a Foreign Affairs Council 
in Brussels, which deliberated about new sanctions and preferred 
to send two ministers as EU envoys to Kiev. So, on 21 February, an 
agreement was brokered in Kiev between President Yanukovych 
and the opposition for early elections with the help of the Foreign 
Ministers of Germany (Steinmeier), Poland (Sikorski), a high official 
from the Foreign Ministry (Forunier) and the Russian Human Rights 
Commissioner (Lukin).91 However, on the next day, Yanukovych 
fled the country. Mrs Timoschenko was released from prison and 
her deputy party leader was appointed interim president. HR Ashton 
applauded these new developments from Brussels and hoped for a 
stable, prosperous and democratic future for Ukraine.92
4.2.2  The annexation of Crimea and EU sanctions
Tragically, the Kremlin did not share this vision. Rather, it used the 
weakness of the new interim government in Kiev to destabilize its 
neighbour. Paramilitary troops emerged in the Crimea, a predominantly 
Russian-speaking region that had belonged to Russia in Soviet times. 
Moreover, armed separatists took power in Simferopol and a couple 
of cities. They called for an independence referendum in breach of 
87 Ian Traynor, ‘Vladimir Putin Tells Brussels to Stay Out of Ukraine’s Political Crisis’ 
The Guardian (28 January 2014) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/
vladimir-putin-ukraine-crisis-eu.
88 EEAS, statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following her meeting 
with Ukrainian Opposition (31 January 2014) 140131/05.
89 EEAS, remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to 
Kiev, Ukraine (5 February 2014) 140205/03.
90 G Wiegand and E Schulz, ‘The EU and its Eastern Partnership: Political Association and 
Economic Integration in a Rough Neighbourhood’ in C Herrmann et al (eds) Trade Policy 
Between Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship, European Yearbook of International Economic Law 
(Springer 2015) 321, 323.
91 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine 
was signed in Kiev (21 February 2014) http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-
news/18110-21-lyutogo-cr-u-kijevi-pidpisano-ugodu-z-vregulyuvannya-krizi-v-ukrajini.
92 EEAS statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the latest 
developments in Ukraine (22 February 2014) 140222/01.
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the Ukrainian constitution, and on 1 March, the Russian Parliament 
empowered the President to send Russian armed forces to the Crimea. 
This obvious breach of the UN Charter and the OSCE Final Act was 
immediately condemned by the Foreign Affairs Council on 3 March 
2014. The ministers also called on HR Ashton to ‘continue her contacts 
with all parties with a view to contributing to a peaceful resolution of 
this crisis’.93 However, there is no trace of any such activity. Rather, 
by vote of 16 March 2014, which was neither free nor fair, 97 per cent 
of the inhabitants in the Crimea are said to have declared their wish 
to become part of the Russian Federation. That step was executed a 
day after the referendum. The European Council qualified it as an act 
of annexation and imposed sanctions upon Russia in an extraordinary 
meeting.94 Moreover, the EU (Council President van Rompuy and 
Commission President Barroso) and the interim Ukraine government 
(PM Yatseniuk) signed the political provisions of the EU–Ukraine 
Association Agreement on 21 March 2014 to underline the firm 
pro-Western course of the new Ukrainian leadership.
4.2.3  The fight over eastern Ukraine and EU involvement from Geneva 
to Minsk I
Even worse, shortly after the annexation of the Crimea, troubles in 
eastern Ukraine intensified. This time, Mrs Ashton took some initiative. 
She explained to the Foreign Affairs Council that she had invited the 
foreign ministers of the United States, Russia and Ukraine for talks in 
Geneva.95 At the meeting of 17 April, these four powers called, inter 
alia, for the disarmament of all illegal armed groups and the return of 
illegally seized buildings in exchange for amnesty and asked a special 
OSCE monitoring mission to help the Ukrainian government in imple-
menting de-escalation measures.96 Moreover, the EU offered help in 
numerous ways. It not only promised economic and financial help to 
93 Council of the European Union, Press Release 3305th Council Meeting Foreign Affairs 
(3 March 2014) 7196/14, Presse 114, PR CO 13, 7.
94 Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures 
in Respect of Actions Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty 
and Independence of Ukraine (17 March 2014) OJ L78, 16–21. For the subsequent 
implementation of the Crimea-related sanctions see F Hoffmeister, ‘The Practice of 
the European Union with Respect to the Territorial Integrity of and Border Disputes 
between States’, in Société Francaise pour le Droit International (ed), Droit des Frontières 
Internationales/The Law of International Borders (Pedone 2016) 277, 281–3.
95 Council of the European Union, Press Release 3309th Council Meeting Foreign Affairs 
(15 April 2014) 8763/14, Presse 219, PR CO 21, 2.
95 Council of the European Union, Press Release 3309th Council Meeting Foreign Affairs 
(15 April 2014) 8763/14, Presse 219, PR CO 21, 2.
96 EEAS, Geneva Statement on Ukraine (17 April 2014) 140417/01.
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Ukraine; Commission President Barroso also accepted President Putin’s 
proposal for consultations with Russia and Ukraine – trilateral consulta-
tions – on the security of gas supply and transit, as remarked in the EU–
US press conference after the Geneva meeting.97 That was an important 
gesture as the outstanding gas debts of Kiev to Gazprom could probably 
only be paid with EU credits.
However, that moment of diplomatic glory was short-lived. A 
downwards spiral of violence was already registered at the end of 
April.98 Moreover, the regions around Donetsk and Luhansk held 
referenda and declared their independence in mid-May. This triggered 
another round of sanctions, with the Foreign Affairs Council adding 
more persons on the list.99 The only positive development was that the 
presidential elections in Ukraine were properly conducted on 25th May, 
leading to the inauguration of Piotr Poroshenko as the new democratic 
leader of the country.
In this tense situation, an ad hoc group gathered in Normandy on 
6 June 2014. Meeting on the occasion of D-Day, to commemorate the 
landing of the Allies in France in 1944 in their war against Germany, 
the heads of states of France and Germany brought the newly elected 
Ukrainian President Poroshenko and the Russian President Putin 
together for 15 minutes before the official lunch.100 In this ‘Normandy 
format’ the developments in eastern Ukraine were touched upon, but 
also the economic relationship between Ukraine and the EU. One of 
the official Russian concerns was that with the renewed Ukrainian 
commitment to also sign the rest of the EU Association Agreement, 
the enlarged trade relations between Kiev and Brussels would be 
necessarily to the detriment of Russia. Putin seems to have urged his 
counterparts to stop such a move, or at least to take Russian interests 
sufficiently into account.
During the summer months, the tension grew. On 27 June, 
Poroshenko signed the remaining parts of the EU–Ukraine Association 
Agreement, seen as a hostile act by Moscow. The new Ukrainian 
97 US Department of State, remarks with EU High Representative Catherine Ashton after 
their meeting (April 17 2014) http://m.state.gov/md224947.htm.
98 EEAS, statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the EU response to 
the worsening security situation in eastern Ukraine (29 April 2014) 140429/02.
99 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 477/2014 of 12 May 2014, Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in Respect of Actions 
Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Independence of 
Ukraine (12 May 2014) OJ L137, 3–5.
100 John Irish, Jeff Mason and Alexei Anishchuck, ‘Putin, Ukraine Leader Break Crisis 
Ice at D-Day Event’ Reuters (6 June 2014) http://www.reuters.com/article/u s - d d a y - a n 
niversary-idUSKBN0EG2V020140606.
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Minister for Defence ruled out a unilateral ceasefire on 8 July, and on 
17 July a civil plane (MH 17) was shot over Ukrainian territory probably 
by pro-Russian separatists. Heavy fighting also occurred on the Donetsk 
airport. Following a decision of the European Council of 16 July, the 
EU Council enacted on 22 July a further round of sanctions, this time 
targeting investment into the Crimea.101
Against that background, the President of Belarus, Lukashenko, 
held an unusual diplomatic gathering in Minsk at the end of August 
2014 between the Eurasian Economic Union, the Ukraine and the EU. 
While Putin (for Russia), Nazarbaev (for Kazakhstan) and Poroshenko 
(for Ukraine) accepted, President Barroso (for the European Union) 
excused himself. He phoned Poroshenko and Putin on 11 August,102 and 
let himself be represented in Minsk by an unusual Troika, namely the 
HR Ashton, Trade Commissioner De Gucht and Energy Commissioner 
Öttinger. The HR would cover the foreign and security aspects, while 
De Gucht would look at the Russian worries over the trade effects of 
the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement on Russia. Öttinger would be 
available to advance the trilateral gas talks. After the Minsk-meeting the 
three made a joint statement for the EU.103
The outcome of the Minsk I meeting was threefold. First, 
following a long bilateral talk between Putin and Poroshenko (HR 
Ashton was not allowed) after the restricted dinner, the two leaders 
agreed on the broad outline for a ceasefire agreement with some 
political commitments to enhance autonomy of eastern Ukrainian 
regions. That very night, though, Russian troops entered Ukrainian 
territory in a blunt breach of confidence just built up between the 
two leaders. Nevertheless, their representatives hammered out a 
12-point agreement that was formally signed on 5 September under 
the auspices of the OSCE.104 The OSCE called this process a ‘Trilateral 
Contact Group’ (OSCE, Russia, Ukraine) which also brought in repre-
sentatives of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic and the 
101 Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council (22 July 2014) http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/07/22/.
102 European Commission, President Barroso: phone calls with President Poroshenko 
and President Putin on the situation in Ukraine (11 August 2014) http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-921_en.htm.
103 EEAS, press remarks of the EU Representatives at Minsk Meetings (26 August 2014) 
140826/02 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/ashton/media/statements/d o c s / 2 0 1 4 / 1 
40826_02_en.pdf.
104 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Protocol on the results of consultations of the 
Trilateral Contact Group (Minsk, 5 September 2014) (8 September 2014) http://mfa.gov.
ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/27596-protocolon-the-results-of-consultations-of-
the-trilateral-contact-group-minsk-05092014.
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Lugansk People’s Republic. Second, Trade Commissioner De Gucht 
replied to President Putin’s repeated statement that the ‘Normandy’ 
leaders had promised him to bring a solution on the possible negative 
effect of Ukraine’s economic rapprochement to the West. In fact, the 
Commissioner offered in Minsk that a trilateral meeting between him 
and the two foreign ministers from Ukraine and Russia could review 
the trade impact of the EU Association Agreement on Russia – to be 
scheduled on 12 September that year in Brussels. In that gathering, the 
three representatives from the Commission, Russia and Ukraine then 
found an agreement on the way forward. Brussels accepted to exclude 
the trade parts of the EU Association Agreement from provisional 
application,105 while going ahead with the ratification by the European 
and the Ukrainian Parliament of the entire agreement on 16 September. 
This great gesture to ease Russian economic pain in a broader context 
of de-escalating the conflict would, however, be limited for two 
years. During that period, trilateral consultations could continue in 
order to identify potential avenues to adapt certain trade provisions 
in the agreement if warranted. Third, Commissioner Öttinger would 
accelerate the trilateral gas talks. These were eventually concluded on 
25 September.106
4.2.4  The negotiation of the Minsk II Agreement in the absence 
of the EU
While Minsk I thus provided a temporary relief to the trade and 
gas issues, the ceasefire did not hold for too long. Already at the 
end of September, heavy fighting occurred around the Donetsk 
airport. In Federica Mogherini’s second day in office as the new HR, 
on 2 November, purported parliamentary and presidential elections 
were held in Lugansk and Donetsk, which she qualified as new 
obstacles for peace in Ukraine.107 At the same time, France kept a 
direct channel to Russia. On 6th December, President Hollande met 
Putin during a stopover in Moscow on his trip to Kazakhstan, stating: 
‘Tension, pressure is never the solution. We must try to engage – and 
105 European Commission, Joint Ministerial Statement on the implementation of 
the EU–Ukraine AA/DCFTA of 12 September 2014 http://europa.eu/rapid/p r e s s - r e l 
ease_STATEMENT-14-276_en.htm.
106 European Commission, EU–Ukraine–Russia talks agree on the terms of a binding 
protocol to secure gas supplies for the coming winter http://europa.eu/rapid/p r e s s - r e l 
ease_STATEMENT-15-5724_en.htm.
107 EEAS, HRVP Mogherini talks to US Secretary of State Kerry on her first day in 
office (1 November 2014) http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/m o g h e r i n i _ f i r s t _ 
day_us_eu_en.htm.
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I have done so with President Putin, Madame Merkel and President 
Poroshenko – we must engage in a de-escalation process, verbally first 
of all, which must then be a de-escalation in the events occurring in 
Ukraine’.108
As of January 2015, the situation escalated further on the ground 
in eastern Ukraine. The OSCE’s Trilateral Contact Group intensified 
its diplomatic efforts, and according to HR Mogherini the EU helped 
in this process behind the scenes at official and FM level.109 She also 
condemned the Mariupol bomb attacks on 24 January 2015, most 
probably carried out by pro-Russian forces from Donetsk, and called an 
extraordinary meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers.110 At the meeting 
of 29 January 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council agreed in principle to 
put new targeted sanctions on Russia,111 which were formally adopted 
a week later by the Council on 7 February 2015.
While the fighting still continued the mediation was put at the 
level of heads of state. For this, only the German Chancellor Merkel 
and the French President Hollande went to Kiev and Moscow in early 
February to present a new peace plan.112 Soon thereafter, a second 
summit was staged in Minsk, where the two leaders met Putin and 
Poroshenko together. After 16 hours of negotiations, a new ceasefire 
agreement with much more detailed accompanying measures was 
agreed upon. Again, it was formally signed by the OSCE Trilateral 
Contact Group on 16 February 2015 (Minsk II).113 Nobody was 
present for the EU – neither European Council President Tusk nor 
HR Mogherini. Rather, the two welcomed the deal in Brussels and 
Mogherini phoned the Russian FM Lavrov to talk about implementa-
tion soon thereafter.114
108 RFI, ‘Désecalade’ en Ukraine: Rencontre Poutine-Hollande à Moscou (6 December 
2014) http://www.rfi.fr/europe/20141206-ukraine-rencontre-surprise-poutine-hollande-
moscou (emphasis added).
109 P Valentino, ‘Mogherini: “Me Excluded? What Matters is Team Game and the Policy 
is That of All of Europe”’ (15 February 2015) Corriere della Sera.
110 EEAS, High Representative Federica Mogherini to convene Extraordinary Foreign 
Affairs Council on Ukraine on 29 January (25 January 2015) http://eeas.europa.eu/
statements-eeas/2015/150125_02_en.htm.
111 EEAS, Results of the Foreign Affairs Council of 29 January 2015 http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/01/29/.
112 Richard Balmforth and Pavel Polityuk, ‘German, French Leaders Take Ukraine Peace 
Plan to Moscow’ Reuters (5 February 2015) http://www.reuters.com/article/u s - u k r 
aine-crisis-idUSKBN0L910W20150205.
113 Full Text of the Minsk Agreement, Financial Times (12 February 2015) https://next.
ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.
114 EEAS, phone call between HRVP Federica Mogherini and Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov (26 February 2015) http://eeas.europa.eu/s t a t e m e n t s - e e a s / 
2015/150226_03_en.htm.
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Ever since then, this group of the German, French, Ukrainian 
and Russian leaders was referred to as the ‘Normandy format’. While 
the daily monitoring of the implementation of Minsk II was laid 
into the hands of the OSCE, the Normandy leaders were the leading 
forces inside the EU. Based on their guidance the EU continued its 
measured sanctions regime against Russia. In August 2016, in a 
surprise diplomatic move, the Russian Putin pulled out of this format. 
He alleged that Ukrainian military intelligence had been preparing 
terrorist acts against the Crimea to undermine Russian elections in the 
breakaway territory for September. To end this provocation, said the 
Russian president, he would be no longer ready to meet his Ukrainian 
counterpart Poroshenko and the German and French leaders in the 
so-called Normandy format.115
5. Comparison
When comparing the two cases, a couple of observations can be made. 
First, the Iran negotiations are a good example of how the role of the EU 
has grown over time. This is probably due to the fact that the HR could 
provide for unity between world powers that do not usually work very 
well together. Indeed, the unity of the EU3, plus US, China and Russia 
was not put in jeopardy, even when the Ukrainian conflict soured 
relations between the West and Russia.116 For this sextet, the HR proved 
to be a welcome spokesperson. Moreover, Iran had no misgivings over 
the EU in particular, knowing that the European powers were in general 
more interested in resuming normal trade and economic relations 
with Teheran than the other members of the UN Security Council. In 
this diplomatic framework, the HR could provide the necessary input 
to such an extent that even the transfer of the role from Solana over 
Ashton to Mogherini did not make a difference.
In contrast, the Ukrainian case shows the limited interest of Russia 
to let proper EU actors be involved in questions of its national security 
and foreign policy. Moscow has a traditional policy of reserve against 
the Brussels institutions and is more used to dealing with individual 
115 K Hille and R Olearchyk, ‘Putin Quits Peace Talks after Accusing Ukraine of “Incursion” 
into Crimea’ Financial Times (11 August 2016) 1.
116 P Wittig, German Ambassador to the US, Atlantic Council (2015). Europe and the 
Iran Nuclear Deal, transcript from a conference held in Washington on 26 May 2005 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/europe-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal, 2nd 
intervention, 2nd para.
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Member States instead.117 This was felt already in the Geneva talks 
in April 2014, further exemplified in the treatment of HR Ashton in 
Minsk I, and culminating in the clear wish from Putin only to deal 
with Merkel and Hollande in Minsk II. He was neither interested in 
negotiating with a Polish President of the European Council, nor would 
the Russian Foreign Minister accept HR Mogherini as a legitimate 
counterpart in security-related talks. Only when this is unavoidable, as 
in trade and energy-talks, would the Russian side be prepared to engage 
with the relevant EU Commissioners, knowing that they call the shots 
on the other side.
It can hence be concluded that the external representation of 
the EU in CFSP matters is not only dependent on the internal (legal) 
arrangements, but also to a surprisingly high degree by the acceptability 
of the EU actor by the third country in question. For the effectiveness 
and coherence of the EU’s foreign policy, this is far from ideal. The 
Iran experience shows that involvement of the HR fulfilled at least two 
functions. It not only helped to forge an international alliance, but it also 
made sure that sensitive information could flow inside the EU between 
all Member States. In contrast, the Normandy format gave rise to doubts 
as to whether Germany and France would be tough enough vis-à-vis 
Russia and at the same time properly represent the concerns of other EU 
Member States, in particular the Eastern European ones.118 Moreover, 
the suspicion levelled against the leading EU actors because of their 
nationality (the Italian HR Mogherini being seen as too Russian-friendly, 
while the Polish Council President Tusk seen as too Russian-unfriendly) 
did not help in boosting their credibility to be able to speak for the EU 
as a whole. Finally, as HR Ashton had given precedence to the Iran 
nuclear tasks over the Ukraine, HR Mogherini probably paid a price for 
that, lacking any established institutionalized EU role which she could 
have taken over from her predecessor. This perception could only be 
changed if the EU leaders would indiscriminately insist that the EU High 
Representative cannot be sidelined even in difficult cases. Clearly, in the 
Ukrainian conflict there was also a defined EU policy (non-recognition 
of the annexation in Crimea and containing the destabilization in eastern 
Ukraine) that she could have represented.
117 R Allison, ‘“Russia in Europe” or “Russia and Europe”’?, in R Allison, M Light and 
S White (eds), Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe (Chatham House Papers) (Wiley-
Blackwell 2006) 160–80.
118 S De Galbert, ‘The Impact of the Normandy Format on the Conflict in Ukraine: Four 
Leaders, Three Cease-fires, and Two Summits’ (Center for Strategic and International 
Studies 2015) http://csis.org/publication/impact-normandy-format- conflict -ukra ine- four 
- leaders-three-cease-fires-and-two-summits.
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6. Recent practice in integrated external policies
In the field of integrated external policies, such dilemmas of external 
acceptance of the EU representatives do not exist to the same extent. 
However, when looking at recent practice from trade and international 
environment negotiations, a number of other internal discussions 
emerged.
6.1 trade
In the EU’s common commercial policy, the starting point is easy. The 
EU is represented by the Commission, which has to consult with the 
Council in policy-making. Article 207(3) TFEU repeats the general 
procedural rules on treaty-making and adds that ‘the Commission 
shall report regularly to the special committee and to the European 
Parliament on the progress of negotiations’. This reporting obligation 
to the European Parliament echoes Article 218(10) TFEU, which gives 
the Parliament a right to be immediately informed about treaty negotia-
tions in other fields as well. What is more important for external repre-
sentation is the approach of the Council towards the negotiation powers 
of the Commission.
6.1.1  Bilateral trade agreements
For bilateral trade agreements, there is a strong tendency to insist on 
mixity even though trade is a field where the Lisbon Treaty expanded 
the EU’s powers considerably. As a result, the post-Lisbon EU trade 
agreements with South Korea, with Central America, and with Peru 
and Colombia were all concluded by the EU and all its Member 
States together. Luckily, though, the Council did not go so far as to 
impose a second negotiator for the alleged ‘national’ competences 
as well. Rather, even in situations where it earmarked already in 
the negotiating directives that it regarded some future aspects of the 
agreement as falling into mixed competence (such as some aspects 
of the investment chapter in TTIP),119 the Council appointed the 
Commission only as EU negotiator under Article 218(3) TFEU. It can 
119 See §22 of the negotiating directives with the US of 17 June 2013: ‘The aim of 
negotiations on investment will be to negotiate investment liberalisation and protection 
provisions including areas of mixed competence, such as portfolio investment, property 
and expropriation aspects, on the basis of the highest levels of liberalisation and highest 
standards of protection that both Parties have negotiated so far’ (reprinted in Kuijper 
and Wouters et al, The Law of EU External Relations, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 
2015) 60).
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be inferred that the Council was hence convinced that in the trade field 
two chief negotiators (one for the EU part and one for the claimed 
national part) do not strengthen the EU’s hand in the negotiations. A 
reason for this consideration may be that the national part is contested 
between the Commission and the Council and in any way forms only 
a minor part of the overall substance. Nevertheless, the insistence on 
mixity all the time has driven the Commission to ask for an opinion 
of the European Court of Justice on the division of competences 
under Article 207 TFEU in the case of the Singapore trade agreement. 
This opinion will be of crucial importance for the future of EU trade 
agreements.
In addition, there is a certain tendency in the internal delib-
erations of the Council to come up with more and more red lines 
which the Commission is asked to respect. This is due to the fact that 
modern trade agreements touch upon a variety of policy fields where 
sometimes strong national interests are at stake. Guiding through 
these divergent expectations from different Member States (and the 
European Parliament with sometimes opposing tendencies) has thus 
become more and more of a challenge for the Commission.
6.1.2  The EU at the WTO
The Council has shown remarkable flexibility when it comes to external 
representation at the WTO. As is well known, both the EU and all 
its Member States are full members of the organization according 
to Article XI of the Marrakesh Agreement. However, in practice, all 
important matters are conducted by the Commission: Doha negotia-
tions,120 trade policy reviews and disputes. Moreover, there has been a 
remarkable breakthrough when dealing with personnel matters, which 
are traditionally claimed by the Member States as falling under national 
competence. When the WTO was in search of a new Director General 
in 2013 as a successor to Pascal Lamy, the EU coordinated internally in 
the Trade Policy Committee in Brussels and submitted its preferences 
via the EU WTO ambassador in Geneva to the other WTO members. It 
seems that there was a silent agreement between the Commission and 
the Council to leave competence battles aside and concentrate on the 
functional necessity to remain united instead. After all, 28 identical 
votes of the EU are more influential than the scattered behaviour of the 
120 At the 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali in December 2013, President Barroso even 
sent three Commissioners: Trade Commissioner De Gucht, Agricultural Commissioner 
Ciolos and – in view of the impact of the Trade Facilitation Agreement on the EU’s customs 
regime – the Commissioner for Customs Matters Semeta.
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Member States which could be traced back in the pre-Lamy elections 
between Supachai and Moore in 2002.121
7. Environment
Similar challenges of leverage on international processes have also 
been identified in the area of the EU’s external environmental policy. 
Internal environmental policy always fell into shared competence under 
former Articles 174/175 TEC, and the Lisbon Treaty did not change this 
(Article 4(2)(e) TFEU). Except where the EU has become exclusively 
competent externally through extensive internal legislation that may 
be affected by international rules (Article 3(2) TFEU), the EU and its 
Member States are thus jointly competent for this area internationally. 
However, the Lisbon reform on external representation can also be 
felt in this field, as we will show with two examples. First, the Lisbon 
Treaty changed the EU arrangements in international environmental 
conferences, which most of the time do not adopt binding law. The 
prototype is the gathering of the ‘Conference of the Parties’ under the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Second, 
new formats emerged for international negotiations for legally binding 
environmental agreements.
7.1 Multilateral climate change negotiations
Under the UNFCCC, the conference of parties have gathered on an 
annual basis since Berlin COP1 in 1995. As the EU had been a driving 
force for the UNFCCC itself, it also tried to play a leadership role in the 
subsequent negotiations concerning emission standards for the period 
beyond 2000.122 Although it was known from the beginning that the 
COPs should strive for the adoption of a legal instrument,123 the EU 
set up an ad hoc format for its external representation. The Council 
nominated the sitting Presidency as chief negotiator, to be assisted 
by the incoming Presidency and the Commission. This informal troika 
121 F Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union in the World Trade Organization – A Model for 
the EU’s Status in International Organisations?’ in C Kaddous (ed), The European Union in 
International Organisations and Global Governance (Hart Publishing 2015) 121, 134.
122 K Kulovesi, ‘Climate Change in EU External Relations: Please Follow My Example (or 
I Might Force You)’ in E Morgera (ed), The External Environmental Policy of the European 
Union (CUP 2012) 115–48, 121–3 with a precise overview about the EU’s negotiations for 
the Kyoto Protocol.
123 UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.1 (1995).
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would act on the basis of a previously defined common position laid 
down by Council124 (acting by consensus). This system had a number 
of drawbacks.
First, at COP3 in Kyoto, the Council’s common position from 
March 1997 proved inflexible and the EU spent much negotiating 
time with itself.125 Only thanks to the relative weakness of the US and 
other actors, it was still able to steer the Kyoto Protocol of December 
1997 near to the main EU negotiation objectives.126 The Union also 
secured a consensus on the implementing rules (the ‘Marrakesh accords’ 
2001) and brought about the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 
exchange for concessions towards Russia in its WTO accession course.127
A more serious second drawback of the EU’s internal arrangements 
was the ever-changing chief negotiator every six months. At COP6 in 
The Hague (2000), for example, the French presidency was unable to 
coordinate well inside the EU camp and the UK even conducted bilateral 
negotiations with the US on the controversial issue of sinks. The UK–
US deal then proved unacceptable to some other Member States.128 
In order to avoid such failures, an important innovation was reached 
in the first half of 2004 under Irish presidency. The Council agreed to 
establish below the level of the ‘chief negotiator’, who speaks in formal 
negotiation settings, the so-called ‘lead negotiators’. These persons 
would speak for the EU in the more open mode of negotiations with 
counterparts from other states and follow a certain topic for several 
years. They came from either the Presidency team, or from Member 
States not holding the Presidency or even the Commission (particularly 
on issues of exclusive or predominant EU competence).129 This ‘team 
EU’ approach injected a much needed continuity into the EU’s external 
environmental representation at working level and freed more time for 
outreach.130
124 M Groenleer and L van Schaik, ‘The EU as an Intergovernmental Actor in Foreign 
Policy, Case Studies of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’ (2005) 12 
https://www.ceps.eu/content/martijn-lp-groenleer.
125 C Damro, ‘EU–UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence and Effective 
Multilateralism’, in KV Laatikanien and KE Smith (eds), The European Union at the United 
Nations (Palgrave 2006) 184.
126 J Gupta and L Ringus, ‘The EU’s Climate Leadership: Reconciling Ambition and 
Reality’, (2001) 1 Intl Enviro Agr 281, 288–9.
127 S Oberthür, ‘The European Union’s Performance in the International Climate Change 
Regime’ (2011) 33(6) J Eur Integrat 667, 669.
128 Kulovesi (n 122) 124, with further references.
129 M Buck, ‘The EU’s Representation in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations after 
Lisbon’ in E Morgera (ed), The External Environmental Policy of the European Union (CUP 
2012) 76, 78.
130 Oberthür (n 127) 672.
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Despite this improvement, the system of external representa-
tion came under strain in December 2009 in Copenhagen at COP15. 
Here, a relatively rigid Council position from October, bridging large 
differences between Member States, did not allow for much flexibility 
for the EU. Moreover, the Swedish presidency, assisted by the incoming 
Spanish presidency and the Commission, was undermined by bilateral 
priorities of some Member States. At the final stages of the negotiation 
PM Reinfeld and Commission President Barroso were even openly 
disavowed when the leaders of France, the UK and Germany took over 
the lead131 to convince China and India to become more ambitious. But 
to no avail, as an uncommonly big alliance between the US, China and 
a group of emerging players, such as Brazil, South Africa and India, 
sidelined the EU. In the end, US President Obama and the Chinese 
premier Wen Jibao brought the conference to an end according to their 
terms; the EU was not even present in the room where the final negotia-
tions took place, and Barroso was only informed about the final outcome 
by a text message.132 Finally, the substance – with political commitments 
on the reduction of greenhouse gases only – was a far cry away from 
the EU ambitions on binding commitments for far-reaching reduction 
goals. The Swedish presidency thus characterized this experience as an 
outright disaster for the EU – an assessment that is shared by academic 
analysts. Some called Copenhagen a ‘worst case scenario, in which the 
EU has only a low impact and was largely marginalized’133 and another 
observer found that the complicated external representation was one of 
the factors for the EU’s failure in Copenhagen.134
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU travelled with 
a modernized set-up to COP16 in Cancun. First, in line with academic 
advice to become a more ‘flexible’ and ‘strategic’ foreign climate policy 
actor,135 it levelled down its ambitions: the EU negotiation position, 
defined by the Council in October 2010, aimed at a concrete set of 
decisions that implement the Copenhagen Accord rather than taking 
131 L Groen, A Niemann and S Oberthür, ‘The EU as Global Leader? The Copenhagen 
and Cancun UN Climate Change Negotiations’ (2012) 8(2) JCER 173, 179.
132 J Curtin, ‘The Copenhagen Conference: How Should the EU Respond?’ (The Institute 
of International and European Affairs, Dublin 2010) 6.
133 G Eppstein, S Gerlach and M Huser, ‘The EU’s Impact on International Climate 
Change Negotiations – the Case of Copenhagen’ (Research paper 2010) 15 http://dseu.
lboro.ac.uk/members/Maastricht/DSEU%20Epstein%20Gerlach%20Huser%20paper.pdf.
134 RM Fernandez Martin, ‘The European Union and International Negotiations on 
Climate Change: A Limited Role to Play’ (2012) 8(2) JCER 192, 199.
135 L Van Schaik and S Schulz, ‘Explaining EU Activism and Impact on Global Climate 
Politics: Is the Union a Norm- or Interest-Driven Actor?’ (2012) 50(1) J Common Mark 
Stud 169, 184.
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new commitments. It also replaced its strategy to lead by example and 
persuasion through a new type of ‘leader-cum-mediator’ (‘leadeator’) 
role, accepting the need for strategic coalition building.136 Second, 
driven by a Belgian presidency whose foreign minister Vanackere 
understood that the rotating Presidency had lost its place in the 
Lisbon structure,137 it upgraded the Commission in formal external 
representation. The Belgian presidency would still act as representa-
tive of the EU in Mexico. But it now divided up the speaking time 
for EU statements with the Commission. Hence the Belgian Minister 
Schauvliege and European Climate Commissioner Hedegaard spoke in 
two separate slots. Importantly, COREPER (Committee of Permanent 
Representatives in the EU) had also agreed shortly before the start of 
COP16, that both actors should speak behind the EU nameplate.138 
Moreover, during the last conference night the Minister left de facto 
the final negotiations to the Commissioner.139 At the same time, the 
EU kept the system of informal division of labour, where a couple 
of lead officials covered different topics below the political level. 
Importantly, inside the Commission, expertise on climate action had 
at the time also been pooled together with the creation of a specific 
Directorate-General, put at the disposal of Mrs Hedegaard (as of 
February 2010).
This upgrade of the Commission as the de facto lead negotiator 
for climate action further continued in COP17 in Durban a year later 
(2011). While the Polish environment minister kept his formal repre-
sentative role, in practice Mrs Hedegaard led the negotiations because 
she was considered as more knowledgeable and charismatic.140 
She forged a key alliance with developing countries to support 
climate action goals in Durban. Not surprisingly, academic literature 
then praised her as the real ‘hero’ for having brokered the Durban 
Platform141 – and no word was dropped about the EU Presidency’s role 
136 K Bäckstrand and O Elgström, ‘The EU’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations: From 
Leader to “Leadiator”’ (2013) J Eur Public Policy 1, 2.
137 T Delreux, ‘The Rotating Presidency and the EU’s External Representation in 
Environmental Affairs: The Case of Climate Change and Biodiversity Negotiations’ (2012) 
8(2) JCER 210, 215.
138 J Thomson, ‘A Member State’s Perspective on the Post-Lisbon Framework for the EU’s 
Representation in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations’ in E Morgera (ed), The External 
Environmental Policy of the European Union (CUP 2012) 96, 108.
139 Delreux (n 137) 221.
140 See S de Jong and S Schunz, ‘Coherence in European External Policy before and after 
the Lisbon Treaty: The Cases of Energy Security and Climate Change’ (2012) 17(2) Eur 
Foreign Aff Rev 165, 84.
141 Bäckstrand and Elgström (n 136) 12.
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there. In the same vein, Commissioner Hedegaard also out-shadowed 
the Cypriot presidency in the subsequent more technical COP18 in 
Doha (2012).
In June 2013, the Environment Council adopted more ambitious 
EU objectives for climate negotiations that should lead to the conclusion 
of a new climate agreement by 2015.142 A week later, the Foreign 
Affairs Council followed suit with a paper outlining the EU’s diplomatic 
efforts on how to convince international partners about these new 
objectives.143 The Council asked that the ‘High Representative and the 
Commission, in their respective role and competence, coordinating 
and working closely with Member States, deploy EU climate policy 
diplomacy as identified in the joint reflection paper’.144 This paper 
is not only the beginning of a structured EU ‘climate diplomacy’, but 
also bears an interesting institutional dimension. Grasping on its CFSP 
competence to conduct policy dialogues with third countries, the EEAS 
takes its share in the conduct of the EU’s external environmental policy 
as a new actor in the field.145 At the same time, the Commission is put 
on equal footing with the EEAS, and the Presidency is not involved in 
climate diplomacy.
But this did not mean that the Presidency was completely out for 
external representation purposes at the following Conference of the 
Parties. At COP19 in Warsaw (November 2013), the bi-cephal repre-
sentation of the EU with the Presidency and the Commission continued. 
However, after the conference, it was the European Commissioner 
Hedegaard alone who welcomed the (limited) progress during the 
conference on behalf of the EU.146
The final step occurred in 2015. Throughout the year, the EEAS, 
the Commission and Member States engaged in bilateral climate 
diplomacy, based on an action plan approved by the Council. With 
such streamlined external messages, declarations of Germany and 
142 Council Conclusions on an EU strategy on adaptation to climate change, 18 June 2013 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/137508.pdf.
143 Council Conclusions on EU climate diplomacy, 24 June 2013 http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137587.pdf.
144 ibid, point 7. The Joint Reflection paper, a non paper of the EEAS and the 
Commission services can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/
negotiations/docs/eeas_26062013_en.pdf.
145 On the potentials of the High Representative and the EEAS to play a role in the 
EU’s environmental policy see C Damro, ‘The Post-Lisbon Institutions and EU External 
Environmental Policy’ in E Morgera (ed) The External Environmental Policy of the European 
Union (CUP 2012) 55.
146 European Commission, 23 November 2013, EU welcomes progress on 
international climate action at Warsaw conference http://europa.eu/rapid/p r e s s - r e l e a s e 
_ MEMO-13-1044_en.htm.
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Brazil and of France and China marked important achievements.147 
At the Paris conference in December, the EU was then represented 
in the negotiations by Carole Dieschbourg, Minister of Environment 
for Luxembourg for the Presidency, and Miguel Arias Cañete, EU 
Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy. For the leader’s meeting, 
Commission President Juncker represented the EU. In the second Paris 
week, the EU and the Marshall Islands spearheaded a ‘high ambition 
coalition’, which eventually got Brazil and the United States on 
board. When the conference succeeded to adopt the post-Kyoto Paris 
Agreement, the Union’s previous outreach activities and the increased 
internal discipline seem to have contributed to shape the international 
consensus. The European Commission summarized the success factors 
as follows:
Throughout the Paris Conference, the EU maintained a high level 
of political coherence. All EU ministers in Paris showed willingness 
and determination to succeed. The EU acted as one, defending the 
EU position as agreed by the Environment Council. This allowed the 
EU to speak with a single and unified voice in all phases of the nego-
tiations, a crucial element for the successful outcome in Paris. Most 
importantly as part of the EU’s climate diplomacy outreach, the EU 
and its partners built a broad coalition of developed and developing 
countries in favour of the highest level of ambition. This High 
Ambition Coalition was instrumental in creating a positive dynamic 
during the negotiations and getting all big emitters on board the 
Paris Agreement.148
Clearly, this is no small achievement on process. Moreover, on 
substance, the Paris Agreement speaks to the constitutional aim of the 
European Union to ‘help develop international measures to preserve 
and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable 
management of global natural resources’ (Article 21(2)(f) TEU) as it 
leads a global path for decarbonization and created a new dynamic of 
international cooperation.
147 S Oberthür, ‘Where to Go from Paris? The European Union in Climate Geopolitics’ 
(2016) 2(2) Global Affairs 119, 122.
148 European Commission, Communication from 2 March 2016, COM (2016) 110 final. 
‘The Road from Paris: Assessing the Implications of the Paris Agreement’ and accompanying 
the proposal for a Council decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of 
the Paris agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2.
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7.1.1  The negotiations on multilateral environmental agreements
As observed before, the climate change negotiations are mostly about 
soft law – and even when a particular COP exceptionally produced 
hard binding law (such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement) 
the EU applied the same informal arrangements to it. The situation is 
different, however, when an international conference is staged ab initio 
with the agreed purpose between the participants to negotiate a legally 
binding agreement. Inside the Union, the above-mentioned disciplines 
under Article 218(3)–(6) TFEU come into play, including the novelties 
under the Lisbon Treaty. In that regard, two important test cases arose 
in 2010 – namely the negotiations on mercury and on the Nagoya 
Protocol on the Biological Diversity Convention.
When the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
triggered the initiative to negotiate a new international agreement 
on mercury in 2009, the Commission recommended the Council to 
appoint it as sole EU negotiator on all issues.149 However, the Council 
disagreed. For their lawyers, echoing the predominant view in Member 
States,150 the EU had not yet exercised all competences on the matter. 
Hence, there was some room for the Member States to be represented 
as well. Turning to the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations in Article 218 TFEU, 
the Council felt that the Commission and the Presidency should form a 
‘negotiating team’, referring to a new expression used in Article 218(3) 
TFEU. Both would be responsible for the outcome of the negotiations 
and the positions would need the common agreement of the representa-
tives of the Member States meeting in Council.151
For the Commission this proved unacceptable. It recalled that 
environmental protection is qualified as a shared competence. Even if 
parts of that competence had not yet been exercised, it remained an EU 
competence, and not a national competence.152 Moreover, the wording 
‘negotiating team’ in Article 218(3) TFUE did not enlarge the circle 
of EU external representatives – under Article 17 TEU external repre-
sentation is entrusted to the Commission or the HR only, and never 
the presidency of the Council.153 The Commission hence withdrew its 
149 European Commission, SEC (2009) 983.
150 See e.g. Thomson (n 138) 101: ‘In short, whilst the changes made by the Lisbon 
Treaty were designed to provide the EU with a strong voice internationally, this can be 
done without riding roughshod over the legal powers and position of the Member States.’
151 T Corthaut and D Van Eeckhoutte, ‘Legal Aspects of EU Participation in Global 
Environmental Governance under the UN Umbrella’ in J Wouter et al (ed), The European 
Union and Multilateral Governance (2012) 145, 159.
152 In support of that proposition also Wouters and Ramopoulos (n 8) 234.
153 Buck (n 129) 90.
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recommendation for negotiating directives and left the EU without 
any position for the first Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee 
at UN level in Stockholm (June 2010). Moreover, the Presidency and 
the Commission delivered competing opening statements, defying the 
right of the other to speak.154 This was an embarrassing situation as 
external partners got a very clear idea about the internal division in 
the EU.155
However, in the long run, the principled position of the Commission 
proved correct. In December 2010, a compromise was struck. The 
Commission became the negotiator where the Union has competence 
and has acted upon this. It should consult with the Special Committee 
appointed by the Council and the Member States throughout the nego-
tiations156 (meaning both in Brussels and on-spot). But such Committee 
cannot issue instructions to the Commission.157 Rather, in line with the 
above-mentioned ECJ case,158 its task remains consultative. In return, 
the Commission accepted that the Presidency led on a number of insti-
tutional issues (e.g. financial assistance) which could be considered of 
Member State competence. With this arrangement, the EU participated 
effectively in the 2nd meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee 
in Chiba, Japan (January 2011) and all subsequent meetings, leading 
finally to the adoption of the Minamata Convention on Mercury. The 
Council authorized the EU’s signature in September 2013,159 and an EU 
representative and 21 Member States actually signed the text in October 
2013. Its ratification by the EU160 and its Member States is currently 
pending.
The second – and less controversial – case referred to the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). It was negotiated during the 10th meeting of the 
Conference of the CBD parties in October 2010. Here, again, the Council 
authorized the Commission to negotiate on behalf of the Union on most 
topics with formal negotiating directives under Article 218(2) TFEU. 
At the same time, the Commission confirmed its intention to directly 
154 Corthaut and Van Eeckhoutte (n 151) 159. 
155 Delreux (n 137) 214.
156 Council Decision on the participation of the Union in negotiations on a legally 
binding instrument on mercury further to Decision 25/5 of the Governing Council of UNEP, 
Doc 16632/10, 6 December 2010.
157 For that proposition see Thomson (n 138) 96, 99.
158 (n 25) paras 85–97.
159 Council Decision of 23 September 2013 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of the Minamata Convention on Mercury (Doc 11995/13).
160 See Commission Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Minamata 
Convention of 2 February 2016, COM (2016) 42 final.
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nominate experts from Member States in the Union’s negotiating team 
and entrust them with specific tasks under his guidance. Indeed, the 
EU team was then made up of three Commission officials plus experts 
from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and 
the UK.161 This carried over the pre-Lisbon ‘team EU’ approach from 
climate negotiations, but with an important institutional difference. 
The involvement of Member State experts would not be a consequence 
of a Presidency decision as part of the ‘negotiating team’ under Article 
218(3) TFEU, but it would be the result of a decision of the Commission 
as the main appointed formal negotiator. For the remaining topics 
deemed of national competence, the Belgian presidency led the EU 
delegation, assisted by Member States’ representatives. In the plenary, 
both the Commission and the Presidency spoke from behind the EU 
nameplate, sitting side by side and using a joint microphone.
8. Comparison
In the field of trade policy the Lisbon changes have given an ever stronger 
role to the European Commission in external representation. Endowed 
with broader exclusive powers under Article 207 TFEU, it was able to fill 
the entire international stage in multi- and bilateral negotiations. And 
even when it came to the selection of the next WTO Director-General – 
arguably a political trade matter – it brought about a coordinated EU 
position, leaving no room for the High Representative to take over. In 
contrast, the external environmental policy has seen a less federalist 
dynamic. Based on the legal ground that this shared competence still 
keeps some Member State competence untouched, the Presidency has 
survived in subsequent conferences of the parties on climate change and 
in the treaty negotiations on mercury and biological diversity. Moreover, 
the EEAS has formally come into this policy although environmental 
issues have not much to do with CFSP, except when construing them 
as a security matter.162 This involvement was rather done under the 
post-Lisbon hat ‘climate diplomacy’, where a wide net of EU delegations 
in the world under the authority of the High Representative is used 
to foster EU goals. The determination of those objectives remained in 
the hands of the (Environmental) Council. However, in both instances 
(treaty negotiations and climate diplomacy), the Commission keeps 
161 Buck (n 129) 93, note 59.
162 Damro (n 145) 62 gives the example of ‘conflicts over climate change and migration, 
caused by water and land scarcity’.
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the strings together. De facto, its external role has become increasingly 
important to represent the EU on most environmental matters, and the 
role of the Presidency declined accordingly.
9. Conclusion
Seven years after Lisbon, the external representation of the European 
Union has not become any easier. While an initial analysis of the 
Lisbon Treaty’s text had already rightly concluded that sharing this 
task between the High Representative, the President of the European 
Council and the Commission makes it uncertain whether greater unity 
and coherence will be projected in the international scene,163 practice 
has shown that the reality is even more complicated: Europe has the 
luxury to let two Presidents, one High Representative and at least three 
external Commissioners (trade, development, enlargement) speak at 
high level international events ‘on behalf of the European Union’. 
Other Commissioners represent the Union for the external dimension of 
their internal policies as well. In addition, as shown with the example of 
the Union’s environmental diplomacy, the rotating Presidency has still 
survived in those fields, albeit the constitutional basis for its action is 
doubtful. Therefore, one cannot speak about a ‘unified’ external repre-
sentation. Rather, the current system is very much characterized by 
‘sectoral’ external representation. This, in turn, means that the double-
hatting of the High Representative had much less effect than probably 
expected by the drafters of the Convention and the Lisbon Treaty.
Moreover, when it comes to representing the Union in CFSP matters, 
the case studies of Iran and Ukraine have shown that the acceptance of 
the EU actors by third countries in question is another important factor. 
Where such acceptance is missing, EU Member States can still come in 
and create ad hoc formats, such as the Normandy format. Hence, the 
role of the Council President and the High Representative still depends 
very much on the political will of others.
Going one step further into internal decision-making, the situation 
has improved over the last years, though in the area of non-CFSP 
policies. With guidance from the Court of Justice, it is by now clear 
that the Council can exercise policy-making, whereas the Commission 
should not be curtailed in its role as external representative. In return, 
the Commission must pay due respect to the duty of sincere cooperation. 
163 Kaddous (n 7) 219.
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Hence, Council negotiation directives are needed to negotiate interna-
tional agreements, a prior Council approval is warranted before the 
Commission may conclude a political MoU, and the Council should be 
consulted before submitting briefs before international Courts. In the 
area of shared competence, the Commission has also been willing to 
integrate Member State experts in its negotiating teams.
All in all, Europe thus continues to operate a multi-layered system 
of external representation, where supra-national elements with a 
strong role of the Commission in important areas are combined with 
inter-governmental traits of a principal–agent relationship between the 
Council and its President or the High Representative. Is this any better 
to understand Europe from a third country perspective? Probably not. Is 
this any better for the EU’s efficiency as a diplomatic actor than before 
Lisbon? Probably yes. Is this a satisfactory conclusion of this article? 
Probably we should leave this judgment to the esteemed reader of 
this journal whom we hope not to have disappointed in the first issue 
thereof.112 European Commission (n 76):
